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Abstract. Advances in E2E verifiable voting have the potential to fundamen-
tally restore trust in elections and democratic processes in society. In this chapter,
we provide a comprehensive introduction to the field. We trace the evolution of
privacy and verifiability properties in the research literature and describe the oper-
ations of current state-of-the-art E2E voting systems. We also discuss outstanding
challenges to the deployment of E2E voting systems, including technical, legal,
and usability constraints.
Our intention, in writing this chapter, has been to make the innovations in this
domain accessible to a wider audience. We have therefore eschewed description
of complex cryptographic mechanisms and instead attempt to communicate the
fundamental intuition behind the design of E2E voting systems. We hope our
work serves as a useful resource and assists in the future development of E2E
voting.
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1 Introduction
The use of cryptography to secure elections was first suggested by Chaum in 1981 in
a highly influential paper on anonymous communications [1]. Chaum described new
cryptographic primitives, or building blocks, and proposed various applications for
these, including the possibility of conducting remote electronic elections. This idea
proved popular in the academic research community, and, over the next two decades,
a multitude of voting systems appeared in the literature, a handful of which resulted in
actual prototype solutions [2] [3]. However, research in this domain was, for the most
part, confined to academia and progressed independent of developments in real-world
election technology.
In the last fifteen years however the situation has dramatically altered. Research
in securing elections has received a significant boost because of two main reasons:
∗ This is a self-archived version of a chapter due to appear in the book “Real-World Electronic
Voting: Design, Analysis and Deployment”, edited by Feng Hao and Peter Y. A. Ryan, part of
the Series in Security, Privacy and Trust published by CRC Press, 2016.
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First, the gridlock in the US presidential election of 2000 between George W. Bush
and Al Gore cast a spotlight on the deficiencies of the US voting infrastructure where
voters faced considerable difficulties in casting votes due to confusing ballot designs
and punch card voting machines [4]. This flurry of national attention led to passage of
the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002 which, among other provisions, allocated
generous funding for research to improve voting technology [5].
Second, multiple investigations in recent years have highlighted glaring reliabil-
ity and security issues in electronic voting machines which render them vulnerable to
hackers and compromise the integrity of elections [6] [7] [8] [9]. Indeed, there have
been numerous documented instances of voting machines inexplicably malfunctioning
during live elections, flipping candidate votes, or randomly adding and subtracting can-
didate votes. Since then, academic research interest in securing elections has soared,
and prompted the formation of dedicated conferences and journals and research organi-
zations [10] [11].
This renewed focus has led to the development of a new type of voting system with
end-to-end verifiable (E2E) security properties. This highly promising advance, due
to individual efforts by Chaum [12] and Neff [13] in 2004, harmonizes theoretical re-
search innovation with the ground realities of election administration to provide strong
guarantees on the integrity of elections. We describe next a typical usage scenario which
encapsulates the spirit of E2E voting systems.
On election day, our voter, Alice goes to the polling station to cast her vote. She
identifies herself to polling staff as a legitimate voter and is guided to a private booth
with a voting machine, where she chooses her candidate on the touchscreen. The ma-
chine issues her a receipt, which is essentially a cryptographically masked copy of her
vote. In the booth, Alice can also verify, either visually, or by challenging the machine,
that her vote was cast as intended, i.e. the cryptographic obfuscation does indeed repre-
sent her chosen candidate and not another. After polls close, the system posts copies of
all receipts on a public bulletin board or website where Alice confirms that her vote has
been recorded as cast, i.e. her receipt is included in the lot and it matches the physical
copy she has in her hand. In the final step, all receipts on the website are processed in a
series of cryptographic computations to yield the election result. The algorithms and pa-
rameters for these operations are specified on the website, and any technically-minded
person, including Alice herself, can therefore verify that her own vote was tallied as
recorded and that the tally is indeed correct.
This scenario is starkly different from the current state of real-world elections where
Alice has to implicitly trust the voting system and its administrators for the credibility
of the election. Dishonest polling staff have been known to manipulate election results.
Furthermore, the internal operations of voting machines are opaque to Alice and she
has no assurance that the machine is actually doing what it is supposed to.3 E2E voting
systems, on the other hand, preclude trust in personnel and machines and make the
voter herself an active participant in auditing the election at every step and certifying
its result. If a voting machine loses Alice’s vote or switches it to another candidate,
3 This realization was fundamental to the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Ger-
many in 2009 declaring electronic voting as ‘unconstitutional’ and thereby marking Germany’s
return to paper-based voting [14].
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her receipt on the website will reflect this change and Alice can file a complaint, using
her own physical copy as evidence. If polling staff tamper with the final tally, any third
party running the tallying or verification algorithm on their own computers will pick
up on it. Furthermore, since Alice’s receipt is an obfuscation of her choice, she cannot
use it to convince a third party of how she voted, thereby thwarting vote-selling and
coercion.
We provide here a comprehensive high-level introduction to the field of E2E voting.
The writing is aimed at the layman with little knowledge of cryptography and attempts
to communicate a clear and intuitive appreciation of E2E voting systems. This chapter
is organized as follows: we introduce security properties of voting systems in Sec. 2. In
Sec. 3-4, we summarize the workings of some twenty of the most influential E2E voting
systems, classified into four distinct categories, as per their reliance on cryptography
(cryptographic and non-cryptographic systems), ballot format (physical and electronic
ballots), and mode of voting (precinct-based and remote voting). This is followed by
a discussion of open challenges to mainstream deployment of E2E voting systems in
Sec. 5. We conclude in Sec. 6.
2 Security Properties of Voting Systems
Here we describe key security properties characterizing E2E voting systems. Many of
these properties are intimately related whereas others are in direct conflict. The merits
of a system are typically assessed on the basis of what properties it provides and how
successfully their inherent conflicts are harmonized within the system.
2.1 Vote Privacy
The privacy of the vote is widely recognized as a fundamental human right and is en-
shrined in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [15]. The rationale
behind this, dating back to ancient Greece and Rome [16], is that if outside parties
become privy to a voter’s choice, it opens the door to bribery and intimidation, ulti-
mately corrupting the electoral process. Vote-buying was not uncommon in the Western
world up until the last century [17] and still persists in some developing countries [18]
[19]. Likewise, voters may be intimidated by criminals, local politicians, or even family
members, to vote a certain way. These fears directly motivated the notion of the secret
ballot, which is typically implemented nowadays by providing the voter a private vot-
ing booth at the polling station. Her ballot bears no distinguishing marks and her vote
is cast in the ballot box where it mixes with all the other votes, making it very difficult,
if not impossible, to ascertain her choice.
In contrast, voting systems in the early research literature (such as [20] [21] [22]
[23]) explicitly maintained the voter-ballot linkage by issuing the voter a receipt en-
abling her to track her vote on a public bulletin board. In 1994, Benaloh and Tuin-
stra [24] (and independently, Niemi and Renvall [25]) pointed out that this strategy
allowed the voter to prove her vote to third party after the election, thereby facilitating
vote-buying and coercion. The authors introduced the notion of receipt-freeness which
proved influential and several voting systems that followed (such as [24] [25] [26] [27]
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[28] [29]) dispensed with receipts entirely, focussing instead on ensuring transparency
and integrity of the tallying operations. However, in 2004, Chaum [12] re-introduced
the use of receipts, with the important distinction that the contents of the receipt are
cryptographically masked, thereby maintaining the voter’s privacy.
Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson [30] in 2005 argued that a coercer may yet influence
a voter’s choice without explicit knowledge of her vote, and described three such modes
of coercion: the coercer may prevent the voter from voting, he may appropriate her vot-
ing credentials, or force her to vote for a candidate at random. The exact difference be-
tween receipt-freeness and coercion resistance is a subtle one [31]: in receipt-freeness,
the coercer is assumed to be restricted to observing the election and using evidence
provided by a cooperating voter. In the case of coercion resistance, the coercer is more
powerful, and may craft specific votes for the voter to cast or even interact with her in
some way while she is voting. Juels et al. proposed a solution to defend against these
threats which we describe in Sec. 3.3.
Researchers have therefore progressively refined notions of vote privacy over the
years into the following key properties:
– Ballot Secrecy: the voting system must not reveal who the voter voted for.
– Receipt-freeness: the voting system should not give the voter any evidence to prove
to a third party how she voted.
– Coercion-Resistance: the voter should be able to cast a vote for her intended choice
even while appearing to cooperate with a coercer.
Intuitively, we see that each property encapsulates the previous one: coercion-resistance
implies receipt-freeness which in turn implies ballot secrecy.
2.2 Vote Verifiability
In real-world elections, the voter has to implicitly trust voting machines and polling
staff for the integrity of the elections. Typically there are ancillary processes in place
to improve voter confidence in results, such as exit polls, random audits, and opening
the tallying process to the public. On the other hand, voting systems in the research
literature attempt to minimize the voter’s dependence on personnel and machines, and
use cryptography to provide ironclad guarantees on election integrity. Sako and Kilian
[26] distinguished between two forms of verifiability:
– Individual Verifiability: a voter can verify that her vote is included in the set of all
cast votes.
– Universal Verifiability: an observer can verify that the tally has been correctly com-
puted from the set of all cast votes.
E2E voting systems recast the notion of verifiability in terms of three core steps:
– Cast-as-intended: the voter can verify the voting system correctly marked her can-
didate choice on the ballot.
– Recorded-as-cast: the voter can verify that her vote was correctly recorded by the
voting system.
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– Tallied-as-recorded: the voter can verify that her vote was counted as recorded.
This translates as follows: the voter first confirms the system has correctly encrypted
her vote. She then tracks her vote on the bulletin board using her receipt and confirms
that it is correctly recorded. Integrity of the result is ensured by rigorously auditing
the tallying process and requiring the system to publish cryptographic proofs of correct
operation. This three-step verification therefore covers the entire life cycle of the vote,
and the voter can be confident that if there is any tampering or breakdown in the system
it will be discovered in one of the checks.
These two conceptions of verifiability are also linked: in most E2E voting systems,
cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast checks are verified by the voter, i.e. together they
provide individual verifiability, whereas the tallied-as-recorded step may be undertaken
by voters and observers alike, i.e. it provides universal verifiability.
2.3 Other Properties
We list here certain additional properties also vitally important in voting systems:
– Eligibility verifiability: an observer can verify that each vote in the set of all cast
votes was cast by an eligible voter.
– Accountability: in case vote verification fails at some stage, possibly due to error
or fraud, the voter should be able to conclusively prove that it failed to the relevant
authorities, without compromising the secrecy of her ballot.
– Robustness: the system should be robust to a certain degree of malfunction or cor-
ruption and still deliver correct results. A small number of misbehaving voters or
system failures should not disrupt the election.
– Usability: the system should enable voters to cast their votes easily and effectively.
– Accessability: the system provides equal opportunity for access and participation
(including guarantees on vote privacy and verifiability) to voters with disabilities.
2.4 Conflicts and Challenges
Several of the key properties described thus far conflict with each other in subtle ways,
resulting in a variety of technical and legal challenges. For instance, as noted in the
discussion on receipt-freeness, vote privacy clashes with vote verifiability. If a voter can
successfully prove her vote to a third party outside the polling station, she could easily
sell her vote or be coerced into voting for a certain candidate. A detailed treatment of
this tension between verifiability and privacy in voting systems may be found in [32]
and [33].
Similarly, there is a tension between vote verifiability and usability. Requiring vot-
ers to verify their vote negatively impacts usability by adding extra steps to the process,
which may prove confusing for the voter [34] [35] [36]. Furthermore, experimental tri-
als have noted that only a very small percentage of voters actually verify their vote [37]
[38], which may critically undermine the security guarantees of these voting systems.
We discuss these issues in greater detail in Sec. 5.2.
Accessability also conflicts with vote privacy. Adapting voting systems to provide
audio/visual aids or human assistance for voters with disabilities may create situations
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where the voter’s candidate choice is revealed to a third party. Likewise, deploying vot-
ing systems for remote scenarios, such as postal or Internet voting, while significantly
more convenient compared to in-person voting at polling stations, results in a marked
deterioration in vote privacy [39]. In her home the voter is not guaranteed privacy and
is also vulnerable to coercion.
Faced with such situations, designers of voting systems typically incorporate tech-
nological remedies or procedural safeguards into the system, prioritise certain security
requirements over others, or perhaps even focus on satisfying certain properties in a
weaker form. We encounter several such examples in the following sections.
3 Cryptographic E2E Voting Systems
In this section, we describe notable E2E voting systems which rely on cryptography
to guarantee E2E verifiability. These systems are further categorized depending on the
ballot format they support: physical ballots (i.e. paper ballots) as opposed to electronic
ballots, and their mode of deployment, for precinct-based voting (i.e. in-person voting
at polling stations) versus remote voting.
There is considerable cross-fertilization across categories. Many systems incorpo-
rate common cryptographic primitives and procedural innovations. Furthermore, sev-
eral systems share a common lineage and design philosophy which we have attempted
to highlight in our presentation. We have also included certain systems which provide
only a subset of E2E security properties, i.e. they are not strictly E2E verifiable, but
nevertheless make an important contribution to the field.
3.1 Precinct-based Voting with Physical Ballots
This category comprises precinct-based systems in which the tally is computed from
receipts of paper ballots which voters mark by hand or using a machine. These systems
are directly descended from Votegrity, and prominent examples include Scantegrity and
Preˆt a` Voter, which have been deployed in politically binding elections.
Votegrity Votegrity [12] was invented by Chaum in 2004 and is one of the very first
and most influential E2E voting systems.4 Votegrity uses visual cryptography to render
the verification process more intelligible to the layman.
In visual cryptography [40], an image is split into multiple shares, such that in-
dividual shares do not yield any meaningful information about the original image and
appear to contain random information. However, when the shares are overlaid the origi-
nal image is reconstructed. As depicted in Fig. 1(a) for the case of two shares, each pixel
symbol is subdivided into four sub-pixels. When the shares are superimposed, identical
pixels on both layers result in a semi-transparent or white pixel, whereas, if the two
4 Several systems in the literature predating Votegrity offer what are arguably E2E security prop-
erties but these are primarily theoretical protocols based on abstract and idealized assumptions.
Votegrity is the first E2E verifiable voting system to address the human complexities and prac-
tical realities of elections.
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(pixel) 
share 2 
(pixel) 
result 
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(a) Construction of white/black pixels
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share 1 
result 
(b) Reconstruction of vote from shares
Fig. 1. Generating a Votegrity receipt (with a vote for Anarchist)
pixels are different, the resulting pixel will be opaque or black. Individual pixels on a
layer reveal no information about the final result.
Vote processing in Votegrity is undertaken by a group of election trustees.5 Public-
key cryptography is employed to maintain voter privacy and integrity of the tally. In
this paradigm, each trustee possesses two keys, a public key he uses for data encryption
and which is publicly posted, for example, on the election website or in a directory, and
a private key used for decryption, which he keeps strictly private. These two keys are
mutually related such that any entity can use the trustee’s public key to encrypt data but
only the trustee himself can decrypt it since he alone owns the corresponding private
key. Many security protocols, including voting systems, specify multiple trustees to dif-
fuse responsibility and trust. In this case, a system’s security, may only be compromised
if all trustees secretly collude. Trustees are therefore typically chosen such that they are
mutually distrusting, i.e. they may belong to competing political parties and include
activists and members of citizen groups.
On election day, Alice casts her vote at her local polling station. She enters her
candidate choice on a voting machine, and presses a button, and a printer attached to
the machine prints patterns on two strips of paper using visual cryptography. These
strips are presented superimposed under a custom viewfinder, and the voter’s choice is
clearly visible. The example in Fig. 1(b) depicts a vote for Anarchist.
Pixels on both strips are generated using a pseudo-random function, i.e. the patterns
on the individual images appear random to an observer but are actually generated in
a deterministic manner.6 The voting machine also imprints a serial number and some
validating information on both strips. Alice randomly chooses one of the strips as a
5 The term election trustee in this chapter is taken to refer specifically to election personnel who
handle cryptographic keys used in the voting systems.
6 Details on construction of the patterns can be found in [12] and [41].
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Fig. 2. Votegrity decryption, mixing, and audit process
receipt to take home. The machine shreds the other strip, issues the chosen strip to
Alice, and saves a digital image of it to memory.
After polls close, the system publishes all saved voter receipts on a public bulletin
board or website. Alice can locate her receipt using the serial number and verify that the
digital image and validating information matches with her physical receipt. If there is
any discrepancy, i.e. if the online receipt is missing or if the two versions do not match,
she can initiate an inquiry with election authorities.
Votegrity’s key breakthrough is this new role of the receipt. The printed informa-
tion includes character strings which appear random to an observer but are actually a
digital encoding of data which enables election trustees to fully reconstruct both orig-
inal strips, and thereby the vote itself. When the voting machine generates the strips,
it encrypts a digital copy of the visual patterns on both using the trustees’ public keys,
and this encryption, or ciphertext, is then printed on the receipt. The encryption may be
understood with the analogy of an onion, where the vote is successively encapsulated
in multiple skins or layers of encryption, each corresponding to a particular trustee. In
the public-key paradigm only trustees can decrypt a vote by applying their private keys
individually to remove corresponding layers of encryption.
The system decrypts cast votes in a privacy-preserving and verifiable manner using
decryption mixes. A mix, invented by Chaum [1], is essentially a permutation box
which accepts multiple data items, removes a layer of encryption, shuffles the items,
and outputs them. A mixnet consists of multiple such mixes connected together in
cascading order such that the outputs of one feed into the next, as depicted in Fig. 2.
A mixnet effectively obscures the link between an input and an output and is a key
ingredient in various anonymous communications protocols. Each mix is operated by
an individual election trustee.
All receipts on the bulletin board are fed into the mixnet. The first mix strips the
serial numbers from the receipts in addition to decryption and shuffling. Each mix re-
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moves a layer of encryption from the ciphertexts, figuratively peeling the onion, using
the private key of the trustee operating the mix. The final result is a set of fully de-
crypted, or plaintext, votes stripped of any identifying information regarding the voter.
These votes are then tallied in a straightforward manner.
Each mix processes its batch privately. Alice can be assured her vote is secret as
revealing it would require all the trustees collude to track her vote across each mix.
However, there is still the issue of integrity: Alice cannot be sure the mixes are cor-
rectly processing the receipts and not altering them in transit. Chaum suggests election
authorities publicly audit the mixes using a technique known as randomized partial
checking [42]. The key idea is very simple: after tallying is concluded, each mix is
forced to reveal a randomly chosen selection of half its inputs and outputs. These are
posted on the bulletin board so that any observer can verify that the mix decrypted and
mixed the items correctly. If a mix tampers with a single vote, there is a 50% chance
it will get caught in a random check. The odds of being detected increase with every
additional vote the mix manipulates, and would be close to a 100% if a mix manipulates
enough votes to influence a large-scale election.
However, while it is essential that mixes be subjected to this check, it is also vital
that no receipt on the bulletin board be traced through the mixes to a plaintext vote.
This is accomplished by selecting input-output links in an exclusory manner such that
no end-to-end path across the mixnet is revealed. For example, considering the first two
mixes in Fig. 2, using dashed lines to denote unmasked links, we see that paths revealed
in one mix are kept strictly private in the adjacent mix.
Now that the entire system has been described, we discuss the security properties
it offers: when Alice casts her vote, she can visually verify that the printer correctly
printed her candidate choice. Furthermore, each strip is digitally signed by the vot-
ing machine. Digital signatures are cryptographic equivalents of real signatures and
have legal standing in several countries. In this case, the voting machine itself has a
public/private key pair and their role is reversed: the machine’s private key is used to
mathematically compute a‘signature’ on the information on the receipt. This is a string
of data which any observer can easily verify using the voting machine’s public key
(available via the bulletin board or in a public directory). Successful verification is un-
deniable proof of origin, as only the machine possesses the private key responsible for
the signature. In case of a dispute, a digital signature is thus non-repudiable proof that
the receipt was issued by a legitimate voting machine.
By digitally signing each strip, the machine may therefore be considered to have
committed itself to both strips. Alice then chooses one layer at random to take home. If
the machine were to cheat and put fraudulent information on single strips for a signifi-
cant number of voters, it would be detected with very high probability.
Outside the polling station, Alice can verify, using the public keys of the trustees,
that the ciphertext on the receipt is indeed a correct encryption of the visual pattern on
her receipt. This gives her high assurance that her vote was cast as she intended. She
can ensure the system correctly recorded her vote by verifying her physical receipt on
the bulletin board. When mixing and tallying are undertaken, the inputs and outputs of
every mix are publicly posted on the bulletin board. Any observer, including Alice, can
monitor the random checks on the mixnets and confirm the results. Randomized partial
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Fig. 3. Voting with Preˆt a` Voter (casting a vote for Anarchist)
checking is well-suited to audit elections as it does not rely on complex cryptography
and is therefore efficient and relatively easier for the voter to appreciate. Any observer
can verify the final tally for themselves by adding up all the decrypted votes. Further-
more, none of the information on the receipt or the bulletin board leaks any knowledge
of the contents of Alice’s vote which a third party may exploit to bribe or intimidate her.
The visual image on her receipt is incomprehensible without the second strip which the
voting machine shredded during the vote-casting phase, and theoretically it could rep-
resent a vote for any candidate.
In short, Alice can now audit the election at every key stage herself and need not
trust election authorities for election integrity. Furthermore, election verifiability is in-
dependent of underlying infrastructure such as voting machines or vendor software.
Technically-minded voters can create (and distribute) software to perform the neces-
sary verifications using the information on their receipts and the bulletin board.
Votegrity has proved immensely influential and inaugurated new directions for re-
search in secure elections. Several systems the followed borrow the basic receipt-and-
mixnet template and improve on practical aspects. We consider these next.
Preˆt a` Voter Preˆt a` Voter [43], initially proposed by Ryan in 2005 as a variant of
Votegrity [?], was later developed into an independent system by Chaum, Ryan, and
Schneider [44]. We provide a brief overview.
Preˆt a` Voter replaces Votegrity’s visual cryptography element with a paper ballot
and randomized candidate ordering. The ballot, depicted in Fig. 3(a), is detachable into
two halves along the perforated line in the middle. The left half lists candidates in ran-
domized order. The right half has corresponding marking spaces and a random-looking
string of alphanumeric characters, referred to as the onion, printed at the bottom. The
onion encodes the permutation of candidate names on the specific ballot relative to a
standard canonical ordering, encased in multiple layers of encryption using the public
keys of the election trustees, as in Votegrity.
The workings of the system are presented in Fig. 3(b). To vote, Alice marks her
candidate choice on the ballot, detaches the two halves and shreds the left side with the
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candidate ordering. She then scans the right-hand side and takes it home as her receipt.
After polls close, all scanned receipts are posted on the bulletin board where Alice can
verify her vote is correctly recorded. However, she cannot prove her choice to a third
party with just the right half of the ballot since her mark could potentially correspond
to any candidate.
Vote processing is analogous to Votegrity. All receipts on the bulletin board are
passed through a series of mixes operated by election trustees who use their private
keys to successively peel the onion, thereby reconstructing the voter’s choice as per the
canonical candidate ordering. The mixing process is audited using randomized partial
checking. The reconstructed votes are tallied in a straightforward manner.
Verification needs to be performed on another front as well: voters need assurance
that ballots are well-formed, i.e. the onions in the lower right half of the ballot correctly
encrypt the randomization of candidates on the ballots. Preˆt a` Voter includes a step al-
lowing Alice to audit her ballot in the polling booth by requesting the system to decrypt
the onions and prove that they correspond to the candidate ordering. Audited ballots do
not count towards the tally and are discarded and Alice may audit as many ballots as she
likes until she is satisfied the system is not cheating and then cast her actual vote. The
authors also recommend that election authorities publicly audit a set of ballots prior to
the election to create public confidence. A sufficiently sized random sampling of ballots
should be picked, making it very hard for a malicious party to distribute large numbers
of malformed ballots without detection. After polls close, any leftover ballots should be
similarly audited for greater confidence.
Preˆt a` Voter is one of the most prominent E2E voting systems and extensive work
has been done in maintaining and extending it. Notable contributions include adapting
Preˆt a` Voter for different electoral systems [45] [46] and voting scenarios [47], enhanc-
ing its usability [48] [49] [50], and implementing the system [51].
A variant of Preˆt a` Voter was used in binding state elections in the Australian state
of Victoria in 2014 [52] [53].
Punchscan Punchscan [54], invented by Chaum in 2006, is especially suited for elec-
tions where rules mandate a uniform candidate ordering on ballots. Punchscan takes
inspiration from Votegrity’s notion of layers and randomizes voter choices on the bal-
lot. The latter innovation is in contrast to Preˆt a` Voter’s approach where the candidate
ordering is randomized on ballots.
The Punchscan ballot, shown in Fig. 4, consists of two layers. The top layer has the
candidate names ordered using numbers or letters (a, b, c, d, etc.) and a set of holes at
the bottom. The lower layer contains a random ordering of the same letters. When the
layers are overlaid, the letters are visible through the holes. In the polling booth, Alice
marks her choice, using a marker to daub the appropriate hole, thereby marking both
layers at the same time. The layers are then separated. When considered individually,
the top layer only indicates which hole she chose, whereas the lower indicates the letter
she selected, and both layers are needed by a viewer to discern her candidate choice.
Alice randomly picks one layer to cast and shreds the other. She retains a copy of the
cast layer as her receipt.
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Fig. 4. The Punchscan ballot (with a vote for Nihilist)
Vote processing is similar to the systems described earlier. When polls close, Alice
can check the bulletin board to verify that her vote was recorded as cast. The ballot serial
number, printed in the top right corner on both layers of the ballot, encodes encrypted
information which enables election trustees to determine the voter’s choice. Punch-
scan replaces the back-end decryption mixnet of earlier systems with an anonymizing
database referred to as the Punchboard.
The Punchboard consists of three interlinked tables. The first one lists all markable
options on all created ballots whereas the last lists the candidate corresponding to each
option. For instance, for Fig. 4, the first table will list an entry for the third option
which corresponds to a vote for Nihilist in the last table. However, the direct links
between entries on these these two tables are shuffled via an intermediate table and the
shuffling pattern is masked using encryption. This is conceptually similar to how a mix
randomizes its inputs but is far more efficient as votes do not have to be encrypted and
decrypted multiple times. Instead the system transmits the marks on each receipt over
the set of secret paths directly to the appropriate candidates, incrementing their vote
count accordingly.
The Punchboard and ballots are generated by election trustees prior to the elec-
tion and their configuration is kept strictly secret. A preliminary audit is conducted in
which half the ballots are randomly picked and publicly revealed along with the corre-
sponding paths in the Punchboard. Any party can verify that votes cast on these ballots
would most certainly have been routed to the right candidates and thereby derive confi-
dence in the system. Audited ballots are then destroyed and the remaining half used in
the polls. After tallying concludes, the Punchboard is again audited using randomized
partial checking, i.e. each path is partially decrypted to prove the system is operating
correctly without revealing any end-to-end paths in the process.
Some attacks have been discovered against Punchscan [55] and corresponding pro-
cedural safeguards have been recommended. Other notable research contributions in-
clude adapting Punchscan for remote scenarios [47], reducing opportunities for privacy
violation [56], and merging Preˆt a` Voter and Punchscan for stronger privacy [57].
Punchscan source code was released under an open-source license and the system
was trialled in elections of the University of Ottawa’s Graduate Students’ Association
in 2007 [58]. Punchscan was later merged into the Scantegrity voting system.
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Fig. 5. The Scantegrity ballot (with a vote for Buddhist)
Scantegrity Scantegrity [59], developed in 2008 by a team of researchers including
David Chaum and Ron Rivest, enhances existing real-world voting systems with E2E
verifiability. The advantage of this approach is that infrastructure, such as optical scan
technology, is already widely deployed and voters are familiar with its usage.
The Scantegrity ballot, depicted in Fig. 5, lists the candidates with randomly picked
code letters assigned to each. A ballot serial number is printed in the top right hand
corner, expressed both in human-readable and barcode format. In the polling booth,
Alice marks the candidate of her choice and scans the ballot into an optical scanner as
she would using a regular optical scan voting system. She then detaches the perforated
corner of the ballot and notes down on it the code letter for her candidate. This small
stub is her Scantegrity receipt.
After polls close, election authorities tally the results of the optical scan system.
Scantegrity vote processing runs independently of this count. Election authorities post
all ballot serial numbers and the corresponding code letters onto the bulletin board,
where voters can verify that their code letters have been correctly recorded by the sys-
tem. The code letter by itself does not reveal the voter’s choice of candidate to a third
party as the letters are randomly assigned on ballots. Similar to Punchscan, every code
letter on every ballot translates to a vote for a specific candidate in an anonymizing
database, in this case referred to as the switchboard. Votes are routed accordingly over
encrypted paths in a privacy-preserving and auditable manner.
This system suffers a few disadvantages: a coercer may force a voter to mark a
certain code letter regardless of which candidate it is assigned to, thereby effectively
randomizing her vote. Furthermore, there is no guarantee the voter correctly records the
same code on her receipt that she marks on the ballot, and dispute resolution entails a
complicated mechanism which involves producing the physical ballot.
Scantegrity II [59] resolves these issues by printing candidate codes on the ballot
using invisible ink which are revealed only when the voter marks her candidate choice
using a special pen. These codes are randomly assigned and are of sufficient length that
they cannot simply be deduced by guesswork. If a voter therefore lodges a complaint
citing a valid code, her complaint is very likely genuine. The process is depicted in
Fig. 6 with a vote for Buddhist. The voter retains the candidate code ODX and ballot
serial number 1679-253 as a receipt.
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Fig. 6. The Scantegrity II ballot (with a vote for Buddhist)
Scantegrity II was trialled in a binding governmental election for the offices of
mayor and city council members in Takoma Park, Maryland [60]. The experience led
to further modifications to the system to incorporate features requested by voters and
election officials, resulting in Scantegrity III [61].
Scratch & Vote In a paper in 2006, Adida and Rivest [62] noted that mixnets entail
complicated mixing and auditing protocols, and require the voter to have faith that elec-
tion trustees will not collude to subvert the election. To address these shortcomings, they
invented Scratch & Vote (S&V), which combines the user-friendly voting experience of
Preˆt a` Voter with the backend simplicity of homomorphic encryption.
Ballots are encrypted using homomorphic encryption, a cryptographic primitive
which enables them to be tabulated while still in encrypted form. The result of a homo-
morphic addition on a set of ciphertexts is equivalent to an addition operation performed
on the set of plaintexts. Only the result of the addition operation is decrypted, thereby
preserving the individual voter’s privacy. Homomorphic encryption was first applied to
electronic voting in 1985 by Josh Benaloh in his landmark work [20] [21] and is a key
ingredient in several voting systems that follow.
To provide voters with further security assurances, S&V distributes the correspond-
ing decryption key among multiple election trustees using threshold cryptography, thereby
minimizing risk of abuse of cryptographic credentials. Threshold cryptography [63]
is conceptually similar to visual cryptography (discussed earlier in Sec. 3.1) in that a
decryption key is mathematically split into several shares which are distributed among
mutually distrusting trustees. The decryption therefore requires the explicit coopera-
tion of a threshold amount of these trustees, and at no time does any party possess the
complete key.
Furthermore, vote encryption is also probabilistic. In public-key cryptosystems, we
recall that the public key used for encryption is not secret, it is accessible to everyone. If
Alice’s vote were therefore encrypted in a deterministic manner, an attacker could eas-
ily mount a brute-force attack to deduce it, i.e. he could use the trustees’ public keys
to encrypt every possible voting option on Alice’s ballot and compare the ciphertexts
thus generated with those printed on Alice’s receipt or on the bulletin board. Proba-
bilistic encryption techniques insert random numbers into the encryption algorithm so
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Fig. 7. The S&V ballot and vote casting process (with a vote for Buddhist)
that every encryption operation on the same plaintext yields different ciphertexts. These
random numbers are large enough that they cannot be simply guessed and they are kept
strictly secret. Probabilistic encryption is important in several security protocols and is
used in all the voting systems described in this chapter reliant on encryption, including
the ones described earlier. The reason for highlighting its use here is that, in S&V, the
probabilistic nature of the encryption plays a vital role in the vote verification process.
The S&V ballot, depicted in Fig. 7, detaches into three parts. The left half lists
candidate names in randomized order. The right side bears corresponding markable
spaces and a barcode. This barcode encodes multiple encrypted data, each ciphertext
corresponding to a vote for a particular candidate on the ballot. In the lower right corner,
a detachable scratch surface conceals the random numbers used to encrypt the barcode
data. Any party can therefore scratch off this surface to reveal the random numbers, use
them to independently encrypt the candidate choices, and compare it with the barcode
data, thereby confirming that the ballot is correctly formed.
At the polling station, every voter is handed two ballots, one to audit and one to
cast. Alice randomly selects one, removes the scratch surface and verifies that the can-
didate ordering corresponds to the barcode data. The authors note that voters generally
do not possess the technical expertise to perform this check and suggest that trusted
helper organizations may assist them at the polls by providing equipment and guidance.
Removing the scratch surface also invalidates the ballot and it can no longer be used.
Alice then proceeds to cast her vote with the second ballot, as depicted in Fig. 7. In a
manner similar to Preˆt a` Voter, she marks her chosen candidate, removes and discards
the left side, and hands the ballot to a member of polling staff. He ensures the scratch
surface on the ballot is intact, and detaches and destroys it without revealing the un-
derlying content. This step is vital as knowledge of the random numbers would allow a
coercer to reconstruct Alice’s vote from her receipt. The ballot, now consisting only of
the voter mark and the barcode, is cast. Alice is issued a scanned copy as a receipt.
After polls close, Alice can verify on the bulletin board that her vote is correctly
recorded. To tabulate results, election staff examine each cast ballot and extract the par-
ticular ciphertext from the barcode corresponding to the voter’s mark. This ciphertext
is essentially an encrypted electronic ballot where the underlying plaintext assigns a
‘1’ to the candidate of the voter’s choice and ‘0’ for all others. An addition operation
is performed over all extracted ciphertexts such that the the ones and zeros assigned to
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Challenge:          1          0         1      …        1 
Nihilist          0 1     0 1     1 0    …     1 0 
 
Marxist          0 1     1 0     0 1    …     1 0 
 
Anarchist        1 1     1 1     0 0    …     1 1 
       …           …       ...        ...     …      … 
Alchemist       1 0     0 1     0 1    …     0 1 
(a) Bit encryption and challenge
RECEIPT 
CHALLENGE:  ALW7 
NIHILIST          N1M2 
MARXIST          81IK 
ANARCHIST    DIR8 
     …            … 
ALCHEMIST    JME2 
(b) Receipt
Fig. 8. Vote verification and receipts for MarkPledge (with a vote for Anarchist)
candidates in the individual votes are directly summed up. Election trustees then engage
in a protocol to decrypt the result using their individual shares of the decryption key, and
post cryptographic proofs of correct decryption on the bulletin board. Any observer can
easily download the contents of the bulletin board and run his own checks to verify that
votes have been correctly summed and decrypted. Individual votes are never decrypted,
thereby maintaining voter privacy.
Adida and Rivest also present extensions to this basic scheme, including steps to
adapt S&V to a PunchScan ballot, facilitate multiple races, and include larger numbers
of candidates. They discuss procedural missteps and attacks which weaken the security
of S&V and note that these are common to systems like Preˆt a` Voter and Punchscan,
where ballots are filled out by hand.
3.2 Precinct-based Voting with Electronic Ballots
This category consists of systems where electronic votes are cast and tallied in a precinct-
based setting. Systems in this category are characterized by inventive combinations of
various cryptographic primitives and include influential systems such as MarkPledge
and the notion of Voter Initiated Auditing.
MarkPledge MarkPledge [13], invented by Neff in 2004, is, alongside Chaum’s Votegrity,
one of the earliest E2E voting systems. The key innovation of this system is a novel
front-end protocol allowing voters to directly challenge voting machines in the polling
booth to prove that they are encrypting votes correctly.
On the MarkPledge ballot, each candidate is assigned a row of indexes denoted by
pairs of bits, as shown in Fig. 8(a). A No vote is denoted by dissimilar combinations
such as (0,1) and (1,0), and a Yes vote is denoted by a pairs of similar bits, (1,1) or (0,0).
When Alice chooses a candidate, the voting machine will assign her chosen candidate
a Yes vote and No votes to all the rest. The machine then individually encrypts every
bit in each index on the ballot and displays on-screen a commitment for the chosen
candidate. This commitment is essentially a bitstring, a series of bits where each indi-
vidual bit corresponds to the Yes/No content of each index, i.e. both ciphertext bits for
the chosen candidate. For example, the commitment 1,1,0,...,1 for Anarchist (encoded
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in an alphanumeric format as DIR8) implies that the bits, as depicted, are (1,1), (1,1),
(0,0),...,(1,1) which are all Yes combinations whereas all other candidates are assigned
No combinations.
As in Scratch & Vote, a probabilistic encryption technique is used to encrypt votes.
Once the machine has encrypted her vote, Alice can challenge it by making it reveal the
randomness used in encrypting either the right or the left bit of indexes (but not both)
for all candidates. This process is depicted in Fig. 8(a). Alice’s challenge consists of a
bitstring, where a 0 denotes bits on the left-hand side and 1 denotes bits on the right-
hand side. Alice can thus confirm that each revealed bit matches with the commitment
displayed earlier by the machine. The machine cannot predict beforehand which bits
Alice will choose, and if it has tampered with her vote (by encrypting No bit combi-
nations for her candidate of choice), there is a very high probability that the deception
will be revealed in the bits that Alice forces the machine to unmask. This mechanism
assures Alice that the machine has encrypted her vote correctly and that her vote is cast
as intended.
Once the challenge is concluded, the machine then generates No votes for all other
candidates on the ballot with the important innovation that it populates Alice’s chosen
right/left bit positions to make it appear that they are Yes votes. All this information,
including encrypted indexes, the machine’s commitment, Alice’s challenge, and the
random elements are printed on Alice’s receipt in the form of short strings of alphanu-
meric characters, as depicted in Fig. 8(b). After polls close, all receipts are posted on
the bulletin board and voters can confirm that their votes are correctly recorded. Votes
are decrypted and tallied using mixnets in an auditable process similar to schemes de-
scribed earlier in Section 3.1.
Alice only needs to ensure that the commitment string the machine originally dis-
played is printed next to the candidate of her choice (i.e. DIR8 for Anarchist in this
case) and she has to retain this string in memory for a short period while challenging
the machine. A coercer, examining her receipt at a later time, will only see Yes votes
for every candidate, and will be unable to deduce her actual vote. Alice alone can dif-
ferentiate her original Yes vote from a fake Yes vote, due to the challenge interaction in
the privacy of the polling booth, but is unable to prove it to a third party. This is also
the reason that the machine only decrypts the right or left bit position, and not both,
during a challenge: if Alice were to record the randomness used to encrypt both bits of
an index, she could easily prove her vote to a third party.
MarkPledge is analyzed in greater detail by Adida and Neff [64] who propose that
helper organizations, consisting of political party members or activist groups, assist the
voter with more detailed verification checks. Joaquim and Ribeiro suggest a mechanism
to make the Markpledge cast-as-intended verification process faster and more efficient
[65]. This front-end verification technique has also inspired other systems: Joaquim et
al. propose two remote E2E voting systems, VeryVote [66] and EVIV (an End-to-end
Verifiable Internet Voting system) [67] which combine this technique with code voting
(described later in Section 3.3) and mixnets.
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Bingo Voting Bohli, Mu¨ller-Quade and Ro¨hrich invented Bingo Voting [68] in 2007,
inspired by the concept of a bingo machine as a source of randomness to protect voter
privacy.
In the election setup phase, election trustees generate strings of random numbers,
such that there is one random number per voter for each candidate on the ballot (i.e.
for m voters and n candidates, m×n random numbers are generated, grouped such that
each candidate is assigned one set of n numbers). These numbers, referred to as dummy
votes, are kept secret, but the trustees publicly commit to them on the bulletin board
before elections using a commitment scheme.
A commitment scheme is a cryptographic primitive which enables a party to pub-
licly commit to a chosen secret without revealing it until a later time. This may be
intuitively visualized with the analogy of a locked box which a prover publicly entrusts
to a verifier. At a later time, the prover uses his secret key to unlock the box and re-
veal its secret contents. No one else can open the box. Commitment schemes are also
binding in the sense that the prover cannot alter the contents of the box without be-
ing detected by the verifier. In our case, election trustees cannot change the dummy
votes once the commitment has been published. Commitment schemes are employed
in various security protocols, and applications include timestamping data and trusted
computation.
Alice chooses her candidate on a voting machine in the polling booth. The booth
also contains a mechanical device, similar to a bingo machine, which Alice uses to
generate a fresh random number. The device displays this number and transmits it to the
voting machine which assigns it to Alice’s candidate choice. The other candidates are
assigned numbers chosen from the pool of pre-generated dummy votes. This particular
configuration of candidate names and random numbers constitutes Alice’s vote and the
voting machine issues her a receipt. Alice simply has to confirm that the random number
she has generated herself in the booth is assigned to the candidate of her choice on the
screen of the voting machine and on her receipt. After polls close, all issued receipts
are published on the bulletin board.
Tallying is straightforward. Every time a vote is cast for a certain candidate, all other
candidates are assigned dummy votes. In this way, a dummy vote initially allocated to
the chosen candidate in the pool of dummy votes is not used. Therefore, the final tally
can be computed by examining this pool and the candidate with the largest number of
unused dummy votes is the winner of the election.
However, election trustees need to prove that voting machines correctly allocated
the dummy votes to candidates. Moreover, this needs to be accomplished without pub-
licly differentiating between dummy votes and voter-generated random numbers on
receipts, else voter privacy would be compromised. First, election trustees publish the
list of unused dummy votes on the bulletin board alongside their respective commit-
ments and the corresponding reveal information. Next, the trustees publish crypto-
graphic proofs testifying to the integrity of the receipts, i.e. each receipt contains exactly
one voter-generated random number, each dummy vote used in the elections was cor-
rectly allocated by the machines, and it was used only once. These proofs can be verified
by any observer and do not reveal any information which may enable him to identify
dummy votes and voter-generated random numbers.
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Alice verifies her vote was cast as intended by ensuring the random number she
generates in the voting booth is assigned to the candidate of her choice on her receipt.
She ensures her vote is recorded correctly by verifying her receipt on the bulletin board.
Her privacy is preserved and she is protected from coercion as the newly generated
random number assigned to her candidate is indistinguishable from the dummy votes
assigned to the other candidates on the receipt. She checks the revealed commitments
and the cryptographic proofs to verify that every random number used in the election is
strictly accounted for and that the tally has been correctly computed.
Bingo Voting was deployed in student parliament elections in Karlsruhe University,
Germany, in 2008 as described in [69]. Another study examines the ramifications of
corrupted voting machines on Bingo Voting and prescribes solutions which may be
generalized for other voting systems [70]. Liu et al. [71] note that reliance on a random
number generator is a potential security vulnerability and devise an alternative solution.
Henrich [72] analyzes the feasibility of deploying Bingo Voting for recent real-world
elections in the United States, Germany, and India.
Voter Initiated Auditing In most of the systems described thus far, random checks are
integral to the security guarantees of the systems. When Alice casts her vote, she has no
explicit guarantee that the machine has encrypted her vote correctly. For systems like
Preˆt a` Voter or Scantegrity which use physical ballots, she has no direct assurance that
the candidate randomization or marking options on her ballot are correctly encoded. Her
confidence, instead, derives from the random audits conducted on the system at every
key juncture and the knowledge that these audits are overseen by multiple trustees. With
these checks, Alice may be certain that any significant malfeasance will be detected.
In contrast to this approach, in 2006, Josh Benaloh introduced the notion of voter
initiated auditing [73] [74] [75] to give the voter immediate confidence that her vote
has been correctly cast. In this paradigm, when Alice chooses her candidate, the voting
machine prints an encryption of the vote on her receipt but does not dispense it. Instead,
the machine asks Alice whether she wishes to cast the vote or challenge it. If she trusts
the machine, she selects the cast option and the printer issues her the receipt. If Alice
is uncertain that the machine has encrypted her vote correctly, she can challenge it to
prove it is honest (this step is often referred to as a ‘Benaloh’ challenge). The machine
then prints on the receipt, alongside the encrypted vote, the contents of Alice’s ballot
and the randomness used to generate the encryption. This data allows Alice, or any
other party, to replicate the encryption step independently using the election public key,
as described earlier in Section 3.1.
The novelty here is that the machine essentially commits to the vote encryption by
printing it on the receipt before Alice chooses whether to cast or challenge. If Alice ini-
tiates a challenge, she can check if the machine performed the encryption correctly. She
is welcome to challenge the machine as many times as she likes until she is confident
that the machine is honest before finally casting her vote. If the machine has cheated by
encrypting a vote for a different candidate, the odds that it will get caught increase with
every challenge.
Voter Initiated Auditing was originally proposed by Benaloh, not as a new system,
but as a vote-casting technique to augment existing real-world voting systems with E2E
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security guarantees, a goal it shared with Scantegrity. It has since then directly inspired
other well-known systems such as Helios, VoteBox, and STAR-Vote.
VoteBox VoteBox [76], proposed by Sandler, Derr and Wallach in 2008, attempts to
resolve myriad practical issues encountered in building secure and usable voting sys-
tems.
VoteBox follows the template set by Voter Initiated Auditing. The system uses ho-
momorphic encryption and the decryption key is pre-distributed among multiple elec-
tion trustees using threshold cryptography. On election day, Alice makes her candidate
selection on a voting machine, which encrypts her vote and then offers her the option to
challenge or cast it. If challenged, the machine prints extra encryption and randomness
information on her receipt. Alice takes this to a special terminal in the polling station
dedicated to assisting voters to verify challenged votes. Alice may mount as many chal-
lenges as she likes before casting her vote.
All receipts are posted on the bulletin board where Alice can verify her vote is cor-
rectly recorded. Tallying consists of straightforward homomorphic addition after which
election trustees engage in a protocol to decrypt the final result and provide crypto-
graphic proofs attesting to correct decryption. Voters and observers alike may download
the contents of the bulletin board and verify the computations.
Apart from its E2E security qualifications, a key contribution of VoteBox is how it
brings together various innovations in the research literature to address a range of secu-
rity and reliability issues regarding the practical side of electronic voting. We list a few
highlights: the authors go to considerable lengths to minimize and partition the amount
of trusted code running on voting machines. Distinct functions of the voting machine
are modularized in hardware and clearly partitioned, thereby enabling administrators to
efficiently audit hardware faults. The voting experience is standardized across all vot-
ing machines by specifying a graphical user interface (GUI) consisting of pre-rendered
bitmap images which correspond to the actions of voters using the machine [77].
Voting machines log all machine events (system messages, the complete record of
encrypted votes, and voter challenges and machine responses) using secure logging
techniques [78]. All machines broadcast and record event logs over a local network, so
that, were a voting machine to fail on election day, all its data up to the point of failure
may be retrieved from the storage of other machines. This also makes things consid-
erably more difficult for an attacker who now has to compromise all machines in the
precinct to tamper with votes undetected. Furthermore, the local network is connected
to the Internet using a data diode [79] which enforces strict one-way data flow i.e. logs
of voting machines in the precinct are publicly broadcast over the Internet, yet remote
attackers are not able to hack into the machines.
VoteBox has inspired some enhancements: RemoteBox [80] extends VoteBox to
secure elections in remote voting facilities such as overseas embassies and consulates.
VoteBox Nano [81] reimagines the VoteBox design using only low-cost hardware com-
ponents, such as field programmable gate arrays. This approach obviates the need for
an operating system or software on voting machine, which an attacker may potentially
corrupt. Furthermore, any tampering with hardware may be visually detected by polling
staff very easily on election day.
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Fig. 9. Verifying and casting a Wombat ballot (with a vote for Buddhist)
Wombat Wombat [82], invented by Ben-Nun et al. in 2011, combines the frontend of
Voter Initiated Auditing with Preˆt a` Voter-style mixnet processing in the backend.
On election day, Alice makes her candidate choice on a voting machine, which
prints a dual ballot as shown in Fig. 9(a). Her candidate choice is printed in plaintext
followed by a detachable portion bearing her electronic vote, i.e. a barcode representing
her encrypted vote. Before dispensing the ballot, the machine offers Alice the choice to
challenge or cast her vote. If challenged, the machine prints a barcode with randomness
information at the bottom of the ballot, as shown in Fig. 9(b), which Alice can use to
verify her vote. She can mount as many challenges as she likes before casting her vote.
If Alice chooses to cast her ballot, the machine prints “For Casting” on her ballot
as in Fig. 9(c) and dispenses it. Alice folds the ballot as shown, using the adhesive strip
to conceal the plaintext. She then exits the voting booth and hands her ballot to a poll
worker. He scans the encrypted vote and uploads it to the election website. He next
stamps both halves of the ballot and detaches them. The folded plaintext vote is cast in
a ballot box, and the barcode is issued to Alice as her receipt. Alice can later verify that
her receipt is correctly recorded on the bulletin board. Mixnets are used to shuffle and
decrypt the votes which are then tallied. The mixnet protocols also provide proofs of
correct operation. All decrypted votes and mixnet proofs are published on the bulletin
board where they may be verified by voters and observers.
Like Scantegrity, Voter Initiated Auditing, and STAR-Vote (described next), Wom-
bat produces both an electronic voting record and a parallel paper trail. This dual vot-
ing approach has considerable advantages: it is familiar to voters who may be more
used to paper-based voting systems. The electronic system may fail, for instance, due
to network outages or trustees may misplace cryptographic credentials, in which case
the paper votes are a handy backup. Paper trails are also a good tool to audit the elec-
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tions, and make an attacker’s job much harder. To subvert an election, he would need to
successfully compromise both the electronic and the paper record.
The team behind Wombat has placed considerable emphasis on practical aspects of
the system. Guidelines to implement Wombat securely are detailed in [83]. At an early
phase they discovered that giving voters the challenge-or-cast option proves confusing
and is unnecessary as only 2-3% of voters need exercise the challenge option to assure
election integrity. This inspired the design decision to hide the challenge option, so that
voters intending to audit the machine issue the challenge themselves by tapping the
screen while the machine is printing the ballot.
Wombat uses Verificatum [84], a free and open-source mixnet solution which has
also been used in the 2013 Norwegian Parliamentary elections. The system is supple-
mented by an open-source Android app for vote verification. Alice can take a picture
of the ciphertext and audit information on her ballot using her smartphone and the app
verifies that the vote is correctly encrypted and signed. The app also confirms that cast
votes are correctly posted on the election website.
Wombat has been deployed in binding elections [82]. In 2011, it was used for stu-
dent body elections at the Interdisciplinary Center in Israel, involving multiple races and
more than two thousand voters. In 2012, the Israeli political party Merez, used Wombat
for intra-party elections, involving approximately 830 voters.
STAR-Vote In 2011, election administrators from Travis County in Texas, seeking to
overhaul their election system, reached out directly to the academic research commu-
nity to assist in building a secure and low-cost voting system. The result is STAR-Vote
(STAR stands for Secure, Transparent, Auditable and Reliable) [85]. Like Wombat,
STAR-Vote brings together the convenience and usability of electronic voter machines
with end-to-end cryptographic verifiability and a paper trail audit mechanism. We pro-
vide a brief overview.
At the polling station, Alice is issued a paper slip with her ‘voting credentials’ which
identifies the appropriate ballot for her. She inputs the credentials in a voting machine
and makes her candidate choice. The machine electronically encrypts and records Al-
ice’s vote and issues her a receipt consisting of an encrypted commitment to her vote
and related information (such as the ID of the voting machine, the time of voting, etc.).
The system also generates a paper trail: the machine additionally prints out a physical
copy of the marked ballot. Alice visually confirms her choice is correctly marked and
then casts it by hand into a nearby ballot box. The election result is tallied from the
electronic vote record. In parallel to E2E verification checks, audits are conducted on
the paper ballots to further validate the results.
After casting her vote, Alice may challenge the machine to prove it correctly en-
crypted the vote. In this case, she informs a poll worker who assists her in verifying
that the encrypted commitment on her receipt is indeed correct. Alice may repeat this
process until she is satisfied and then cast a final vote. This check is in the spirit of Voter
Initiated Auditing but with the key difference that here the challenge and verification
steps occur after vote casting, not before, and are initiated by voters. This is in the inter-
ests of system usability: for voters not interested in challenging the machine, the voting
process is fairly similar to that of existing real-world systems.
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After polls close, all encrypted votes are posted on the bulletin board where voters
can compare against their receipts. Tallying consists of homomorphic addition of the
cast ballots. The decryption key is pre-shared among multiple trustees who cooperate
to decrypt the result in a verifiable manner. Challenged votes are posted as well, along
with verifiable decryptions, and these are excluded from the final tally.
After the elections, risk-limiting audits [86] are conducted on the paper ballots. A
random selection of ballots is checked on two counts: first, verifying if data on the paper
ballots corresponds to the electronic record. The second check determines if the tally
of the random sample approximates the electronic results within an acceptable margin.
This “belt and suspenders approach” [87] of incorporating multiple safeguards aims at
giving voters and observers strong confidence in the system.
The STAR-Vote system architecture inherits several engineering innovations from
VoteBox including strict partitioning of program modules, a GUI consisting of pre-
rendered graphics, and secure auditable logging of machine events.
STAR-Vote is slated for deployment in elections in Travis County in 2017 [88].
DRE-i Hao, Randell, and Clarke noted that voting systems are vulnerable due to their
reliance on tallying authorities, i.e. trustees tasked with tallying election results who
need to be implicitly trusted not to misuse their privileges [89]. Furthermore, as demon-
strated in a real-world trial of the Helios system [90], trustees may lack the technical
expertise to manage cryptographic credentials securely. To address these concerns, Hao
et al. proposed DRE-i (Direct Recording Electronic with Integrity) [91], an E2E voting
system which dispenses with tallying authorities entirely.
The DRE-i ballot consists of pairwise strings of encrypted data, or cryptograms,
assigned to each candidate, depicting Yes and No votes. When Alice makes her candi-
date choice on a voting machine, a Yes cryptogram is assigned to her candidate and No
cryptograms to all the others. The machine issues her a receipt listing the candidates
with the assigned cryptograms. Individually the Yes/No cryptograms do not reveal any
information about Alices choice and resemble strings of random data. Before casting
her vote, Alice has the option of challenging the voting machine to prove it is not cheat-
ing. If challenged, the machine reveals both Yes/No cryptograms for each candidate on
the ballot. Any party can now differentiate between Yes and No votes, and confirm that
they are correctly assigned.
All receipts are published onto the bulletin board where they may be verified by
voters, alongside proofs that the vote is well-formed. This is a privacy-preserving cryp-
tographic proof, used in several of the voting systems described in this chapter, which
allows any observer to verify that the ciphertext on the bulletin board contains a vote
for only one candidate, without revealing the voter’s identity or candidate choice. The
votes are then combined in a homomorphic operation to yield the final tally. There is
no decryption step. Any observer can therefore download the contents of the bulletin
board and replicate the addition to confirm the results.
Self-tallying voting systems have been proposed earlier in the literature, for small-
scale scenarios such as boardroom elections [92] [93] [94], but Hao et al. differentiate
these from DRE-i which enables self-tallying within the broader framework of E2E
verifiable voting, a paradigm they refer to as self-enforcing electronic voting [89]. A
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verifiable classroom voting system based on DRE-i has been implemented and used
[95].
3.3 Remote Voting with Electronic Ballots
This category comprises systems which enable voters to cast their votes over the Internet
and includes prominent systems JCJ/Civitas and Helios. As we noted earlier in Sec. 2.4,
remote voting poses unique challenges which restrict the use of some of these systems
in politically binding elections.
Adder Adder [96] invented by Kiayias, Korman and Walluck in 2006, is a fully-
functional open-source online voting system. Adder is suited to both small and large-
scale elections, as well as surveys and data collection applications.
Adder includes a preliminary setup phase in which multiple election trustees engage
in a cryptographic protocol to create a public key for the election which is then pub-
lished on the election website. The corresponding decryption key is distributed among
the trustees using threshold cryptography.
To vote, Alice navigates her web browser to the election website, logs in using
voting credentials which identify her as an eligible voter, and downloads the election
public key. Alice makes her candidate choice and her web browser then generates and
encrypts her vote using the election public key and computes and appends a proof of
well-formedness. All encrypted votes received by the system are posted on an online
bulletin board, where voters can verify they have been correctly recorded.
After polls close, an addition operation is performed over all the encrypted votes on
the bulletin board. Election trustees then publicly provide partial decryption information
using their individual shares of the decryption key, which enable the server to decrypt
the tally. All intermediate computations are posted on the bulletin board.
Adder’s security properties are fairly intuitive: the voter encrypts and transmits her
own vote and can later verify it is correctly recorded on the bulletin board. Privacy
is ensured because individual votes cannot be decrypted unless a threshold amount of
these election trustees collude. Voters and observers alike can audit the tallying and
decryption process by accessing the bulletin board and verifying each step.
However, Adder is vulnerable to critical security issues common to Internet voting
systems. The first is the untrusted terminal problem: it is trivially easy for malicious
software on Alice’s computer to leak knowledge of her vote or switch her vote to an-
other candidate without her knowledge, and she cannot detect this by examining the
ciphertext. Second, physical privacy cannot be guaranteed. Someone may be standing
at Alice’s shoulder while she votes. Furthermore, a coercer, such as a political activist
or a family member, may force her to vote a particular way. This threat is also common
in other remote voting scenarios, such as postal voting [97].
JCJ and Civitas The system designed by Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson in 2005,
commonly referred to as JCJ [30], is notable in that it is the first online voting scheme to
offer a high level of coercion-resistance. JCJ combines various cryptographic primitives
in a novel protocol that has proved very influential in the research literature.
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JCJ assumes that prior to elections, there is an in-person voter registration phase,
conducted in a trusted and private environment, where Alice receives a voting creden-
tial from the election registrar. This credential is her proof of eligibility and can be
used to vote in several different elections. After the registration phase concludes, the
registrar publishes an encrypted list of all voting credentials on the bulletin board. Al-
ice then uses a public algorithm to generate any number of fake credentials which are
indistinguishable from her real one to a third party. She can use these to cast votes
under coercion or even freely yield these to coercers to vote on her behalf. Votes cast
using fake credentials will show up on the bulletin board as legitimate cast votes but
will ultimately be rejected by the system prior to tallying. It is assumed the coercer is
not monitoring Alice for the entire duration of the election and she gets some private
moments to vote using her real credential.
Votes are cast online. Alice’s vote includes her candidate choice and her voting
credential and is encrypted with the public key of the election trustees. Also attached is
a cryptographic proof enabling any observer to verify that the vote is well-formed and
includes a usable credential (real or fake). After polls close, all vote ciphertexts received
by the system are published onto the bulletin board where Alice can verify that hers was
correctly recorded.
Election trustees then process votes on the bulletin board. Vote proofs are exam-
ined and malformed votes or those with unusable credentials are discarded. A plaintext
equivalence test is used to check if multiple votes have been cast using the same cre-
dential. This cryptographic test compares encrypted votes in a pair-wise manner and
simply identifies, without decryption, any ciphertexts which include a common creden-
tial. No direct information about the credentials or votes themselves is revealed in this
test, i.e. voter identities and candidate choices are still secret. If multiple votes using
the same credential are identified, they may be processed according to some revoting
policy such that only one vote per credential is actually counted. For instance, only the
most recent vote could be retained and all others using the same credential could be
eliminated.
However, this batch still contains votes cast using fake credentials which have to
be identified and discarded. All votes are passed through a re-encryption mixnet. As
opposed to decryption mixes (described earlier in Sec. 3.1) which peel off layers of
encryption from the vote, re-encryption mixes instead simply inject fresh randomness
into the ciphertext. This re-randomization generates a batch of completely new cipher-
texts which are still encryptions of the original plaintext data, i.e. votes and credentials.
These new ciphertexts are then shuffled and output.
The plaintext equivalence test is then again run, this time to compare the encrypted
credential in each new ciphertext with the encrypted list of valid voting credentials
published by the election authority prior to the election. All votes with fake credentials
can then be identified and discarded by the system without revealing the credentials
themselves. Leftover votes are then decrypted and tallied in a straightforward manner
to yield the election result.
The equivalence tests and the mixing and tallying processes are conducted in a pub-
licly verifiable manner, and all intermediate results are posted on the bulletin board
where observers can audit them for correctness. This mix-and-compare process is what
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gives JCJ the property of coercion-resistance. The re-encryption mixnet effectively
breaks the association between cast votes and counted votes such that a coercer has
no way of determining if the credential he holds is real or fake and if the vote he cast
was included in the final tally or not.
However JCJ has a key disadvantage: the processing time and computation costs of
this scheme are very high because compute-intensive plaintext equivalence tests need
to be performed for every vote. There have been several suggestions in the literature to
optimize this process, including [98], [99], and [100].
Civitas [101], proposed by Clarkson, Chong and Myers, is the first concrete imple-
mentation of JCJ along with important modifications, most notably a secure protocol
for voter registration. In the original JCJ protocol, a corrupt registrar could simply is-
sue a fake credential to Alice without her being able to detect the deception. However,
in Civitas, the registrar functionality is distributed across multiple mutually distrusting
trustees. Alice individually contacts these to receive portions of her credential which
she then combines into a final credential. The implicit assumption is that some trustees
are honest, thereby allowing her to construct the right credential.
Distributing registration functionality for JCJ has also been discussed in [102].
Koenig et al. [103] suggest enhancements, including protection against a potential denial-
of-service attack whereby attackers flood the bulletin board with votes with fake creden-
tials, thereby creating severe processing delays. Other proposals include formalizing the
voting-process in Civitas, a user interface inspired in part by Helios (described next),
and credential management using smartcards [104] [105].
The core JCJ architecture has inspired other E2E voting systems which improve
upon its various usability aspects. For instance, Selections [106] provides an easier way
for voters to register and manage credentials by incorporating the use of panic pass-
words, i.e. voting credentials that the voter may create on the fly. Trivitas [107] adapts
Civitas to further simplify the non-intuitive and complex verifiability process for the
layman voter by introducing the notion of trial votes. These are cast alongside regular
votes, and are processed in much the same way, except that trial votes are decrypted
and revealed at different stages, enabling the voter to derive strong confidence that her
actual vote is being correctly handled. Caveat Coercitor [108] extends JCJ’s coercion-
resistance property for more general scenarios including leakage of voting credentials
by malware, corrupt registrars, and impersonation attacks.
Helios Helios [109], invented by Adida in 2008, is an online voting system intended for
scenarios where privacy and integrity concerns are paramount but the risk of coercion
is low, i.e. in settings such as student body elections, clubs, and online communities.
Helios does not introduce any novel features as such, but successfully brings together
different innovations in the literature to build an efficient and highly usable voting sys-
tem. We present a brief overview:
To vote, Alice uses her web browser to navigate to the election website and marks
her choice on an online ballot form. Her vote is encrypted locally on her computer, a
digital receipt is printed on the screen. In the spirit of Voter Initiated Auditing, Alice is
then offered the opportunity to cast or challenge her vote. She can challenge the system
multiple times until she is convinced it is encrypting her choice correctly. When she is
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ready to cast her vote, she authenticates herself to the system as an eligible voter and
uploads the ciphertext. The system posts it on an online bulletin board where she can
verify it at a later time against the receipt she received earlier.
After polls close, encrypted votes on the bulletin board are processed using re-
encryption mixes to effectively break the association between voter identity and cast
votes after which votes are decrypted and tallied. The initial version of Helios employed
the Sako-Kilian mixnet protocol [26] which published cryptographic proofs allowing
third parties to confirm that the mixnet processed the data correctly. In 2009, Helios
was updated to Helios 2.0 which improved efficiency and voter privacy by replacing
the mixnets with a homomorphic encryption scheme and distributing the election de-
cryption key among multiple election trustees.
Helios provides E2E guarantees but, as noted earlier, is not suited for political elec-
tions where the risk of coercion is high. Adida acknowledges this as a general limitation
of remote voting systems and suggests that Helios might in fact educate voters on this
threat. For this reason, the initial version of Helios included a “Coerce Me!” button,
which Alice could press when casting her ballot, thereby emailing a coercer complete
details of how she voted. Adida also notes that a corrupted version of Helios may im-
personate absent voters and cast ballots on their behalf, making it all the more important
that voters engage in the verification process.
Helios has proved very influential and is actively being maintained. The source code
is available under an open-source license. Helios has been the subject of multiple us-
ability studies [110] [111] [35]. A number of vulnerabilities have been discovered in
the implementation of Helios [112] [113] [114]. Examples include cases where attack-
ers may copy and re-cast previously cast votes [115], and a corrupted system may dis-
pense identical receipts to different voters while modifying their actual votes undetected
[116]. Many of these issues have been fixed in later versions of Helios. Improvements
have also been suggested: Helios has been modified to enable new properties such as
self-tallying [117] and stronger privacy guarantees [118] [119].
Helios has been used in several binding elections: the Universite´ Catholique de Lou-
vain used Helios in 2009 to elect the University President in an election with about 5000
registered voters [90]. Helios has also been deployed for student elections at Princeton
[120] and internal elections of the International Association for Cryptologic Research
(IACR) [121] and the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [122]. Helios has
also been adapted to accommodate different voting schemes such as single transferable
vote (STV) and ranked voting schemes. Examples include Zeus, built by Louridas et al.
[123], and another variant developed by Bulens et al. [124]. Both of these systems have
been deployed in dozens of university-level elections.
Pretty Good Democracy Pretty Good Democracy [125] is an online voting system
developed by Ryan and Teague in 2013. Pretty Good Democracy relies on threshold
cryptography and code voting to provide a subset of E2E verifiability properties.
Code voting was first suggested by Chaum as a solution to the untrusted terminal
problem [126] and now serves as a key component in several online E2E voting systems
[66] [127] [128] [67] [129]. The key idea is simple: codes are used to set up a private
authenticated channel between voters and election trustees. Prior to polls, the trustees
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Candidate 
ANARCHIST 
BUDDHIST 
MARXIST 
NIHILIST 
ALCHEMIST 
Vote Code 
2168 
3756 
1247 
9881 
5962 
Acknowledgment Code 
854269 
129853 
875391 
039852 
218931 
ID: 4896327 
Fig. 10. Sample code sheet
send each voter a physical code sheet in the mail which assigns unique, randomly picked
vote codes and acknowledgement codes to each candidate on the ballot as depicted in
Fig. 10. These codes are alphanumeric strings of a length that resists simple guessing
attacks. Each code sheet bears a unique ballot ID.
To vote, Alice logs onto the system, and inputs the ID on her code sheet, followed
by the vote code for the candidate of her choice. For example, she would type in 2168
to vote for Anarchist. The system responds with the corresponding acknowledgement
code, in this case, 854269. Since the codes are randomly assigned and known only to
Alice and the trustees, a malware on her computer or an attacker eavesdropping on net-
work traffic cannot deduce her vote nor alter it in any meaningful way without being
detected. Furthermore, Alice’s vote code assures the trustees that they are communicat-
ing with Alice herself, since it should be difficult for an attacker to procure her code
sheet. Likewise, if Alice receives the correct acknowledgement code, she can be certain
her vote was correctly received by the trustees and not an attacker masquerading as a
trustee. If either party enters a wrong code, the protocol fails.
After polls close, ballot IDs for all votes received by the system are published on the
bulletin board and Alice can check that hers is included in the list. Decryption mixnets
are then used to anonymize votes prior to tallying, similar to Votegrity and Preˆt a` Voter,
and the process is likewise audited using randomized partial checking.
The bulletin board does not display vote receipts otherwise it would be trivially easy
for Alice to prove her vote to a third party using her code sheet. However, displaying
only ballot IDs of cast votes opens up the possibility that a corrupt tallying authority
may alter votes undetected. To address this vulnerability, Ryan and Teague employ
threshold cryptography to distribute system functionality among the election trustees.
When the system receives Alice’s vote code, it engages in a cooperative protocol with
a threshold number of trustees to generate the appropriate acknowledgement code and
record Alice’s vote in the system. It is therefore not possible to alter votes unless a large
number of these trustees are corrupt, which should reassure Alice to a degree that her
vote has been correctly recorded by the system.
However, Pretty Good Democracy only partially addresses the problems associated
with remote voting. There is still the threat that someone may be standing at Alice’s
shoulder when she votes and may even coerce her to vote for a certain candidate. Alice
may sell her vote by giving her code sheet to someone else. An online attacker may pose
as a fake election server and her vote may be lost. Similar attacks have been observed
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ALCHEMIST 
 
 
BUDDHIST 
 
 
ANARCHIST 
 
 
NIHILIST 
BALLOT 
XWQ 
SERIAL NUM.  1679-253 
(a) Scantegrity II ballot
AUTHORIZATION CARD 
AUTHENTICATION SERIAL #  87596 
AUTHENTICATION CODES 
K2LD931MD 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
CODE 
YR 
LOCK-IN 
CODE 
4IRK378D 
(b) Remotegrity authoriza-
tion card
Fig. 11. Voting with Remotegrity (casting a vote for Anarchist)
in remote voting scenarios such as postal voting. The authors, therefore, explicitly rec-
ommend that Pretty Good Democracy only be used for low-risk elections such as for
student bodies and professional societies and not for politically binding elections.
Pretty Good Democracy has inspired other systems: Pretty Understandable Democ-
racy [130] simplifies the way votes are processed. Virtually Perfect Democracy [131]
introduces personalized voter smartcards into the protocol to increase trust in the sys-
tem and provide an element of coercion resistance. Pretty Good Democracy has also
been adapted for ranking-based voting schemes such as single transferable vote (STV)
and instant-runoff voting (IRV) [132].
Remotegrity Remotegrity [128] is an online E2E voting protocol, proposed by Zagorski
et al. in 2013. Remotegrity is not a full-fledged system but an extension to precinct-
based systems like Scantegrity and Preˆt a` Voter, specifically aimed at absentee voters,
and uses an innovative combination of code voting and scratch surfaces to ensure votes
are securely recorded.
As an absentee voter, Alice receives via post a Scantegrity ballot (described in
Sec. 3.1) and a Remotegrity authorization card, as depicted in Fig. 11. The authoriza-
tion card contains an authentication serial number, and three types of codes: multiple
authentication codes, a lock-in code, and an acknowledgement code.
To vote, Alice logs on to the system and enters her ballot serial number and the
authentication serial number on her authorization card. This allows the system to check
that she has not already cast a vote. Alice next obtains the vote code on the ballot
for the candidate of her choice (XWQ for Anarchist). From the authorization card, she
scratches off an authentication code at random. These two codes are sent to the system
as a single message and are posted on the bulletin board. The election trustees verify
that the authentication code is valid. They then append an acknowledgement code to
it, digitally sign the whole message, thereby certifying it as genuine, and update the
entry on the bulletin board. At a later time, Alice checks the bulletin board and verifies
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that her vote has not been maliciously altered and confirms the acknowledgement code
and the trustees’ signature. She then approves the updated entry by scratching off and
submitting the lock-in code on her authorization card. The system again updates the
bulletin board entry to include the lock-in code.
When polls close, the trustees check all entries to verify the lock-in codes are cor-
rect. They then input the ballot serial numbers and the corresponding vote codes for
each entry into the Scantegrity tallying system. These votes are then tallied alongside
precinct-cast votes using the Scantegrity Switchboard in a publicly verifiable manner.
The use of codes effectively defeats malware and hackers who may tamper with Al-
ice’s computer. The scratch surfaces act as tamper-evident seals. If the election trustees
were to cast a vote on Alice’s behalf, Alice could produce her authorization card with
the authentication code scratch surfaces still intact as proof of malfeasance. If they were
to change her vote after she submitted it, she could refuse to commit to it with her lock-
in code. If the trustees were to append the lock-in code themselves, her authorization
card, with the lock-in scratch surface still intact, would prove that she did not autho-
rize that vote. The trustees may issue authorization cards with invalid codes, but this
may be detected by conducting public audits in which randomly chosen authorization
cards are examined for integrity. The protocol therefore ensures that Alice’s vote is cast
and recorded by the system as she intended. Regarding the verifiability of the tally,
Remotegrity inherits Scantegrity’s security guarantees. However, Remotegrity does not
protect against vote coercion or vote buying.
Remotegrity was successfully trialled in municipal elections in Takoma Park, Mary-
land in 2008 [128].
4 Non-cryptographic E2E Voting Systems
These systems represent an interesting experiment in the overall research on E2E vot-
ing. Systems such as ThreeBallot, Twin, and Aperio emulate E2E verifiability properties
in a wholly precinct-based paper-ballot format without resorting to any cryptography.
This approach has only produced a handful of workable systems thus far, but it has
generated valuable new insights about E2E voting in general. Additionally, due to their
exclusion of complex cryptography, these systems aid in communicating fundamental
principles of E2E verifiability to the layman.
ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin ThreeBallot [133], introduced by Rivest and Smith in
2007, derives its name from its unique ballot design, consisting of three detachable
ballots, as depicted in Fig. 12(a). Each ballot is assigned a unique serial number printed
at the bottom. In the polling booth, Alice marks the ballots such that each candidate is
marked once whereas the candidate of her choice is marked twice Fig. 12(a) represents
a vote for Nihilist. Alice’s vote can therefore be understood as a composite of the three
ballots. The ballots are then detached. Alice randomly chooses one as a receipt and
scans a copy to take home. She then casts all three ballots into the ballot box.
After polls close, all cast ballots are published on the bulletin board, and Alice
uses her receipt to verify the corresponding ballot is correctly recorded. The tally is
computed by simply adding up all ballots on the bulletin board. Since each candidate
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BALLOT 
ALCHEMIST 
ANARCHIST 
BUDDHIST 
NIHILIST 
MARXIST 
SERIAL #  48UR4 
BALLOT 
ALCHEMIST 
ANARCHIST 
BUDDHIST 
NIHILIST 
MARXIST 
BALLOT 
ALCHEMIST 
ANARCHIST 
BUDDHIST 
NIHILIST 
MARXIST 
SERIAL #  3O2LZ SERIAL #  94LD3 
(a) The ThreeBallot ballot
VOTE 
ALCHEMIST 
ANARCHIST 
BUDDHIST 
NIHILIST 
MARXIST 
SERIAL #  R4K6M 
ANTIVOTE 
ALCHEMIST 
ANARCHIST 
BUDDHIST 
NIHILIST 
MARXIST 
VOTE 
ALCHEMIST 
ANARCHIST 
BUDDHIST 
NIHILIST 
MARXIST 
SERIAL #  58TKD SERIAL #  UDID3 
(b) The VAV ballot
Fig. 12. Voting with ThreeBallot and VAV (with votes for Nihilist)
receives one vote by default, the result is inflated by the number of voters, which is
accordingly subtracted from the tally. Any observer can replicate and verify the tally.
An important distinction to be made here is that Alice’s receipt is not an encryption
of her vote. Instead, the receipt testifies to a key component of the vote which has been
delinked from the other components. Alice’s privacy is maintained as the receipt reveals
nothing about her actual vote unless examined in conjunction with the two other ballots
she cast, and these could be any on the bulletin board. Furthermore, if any party tampers
with her ballots, Alice has a one in three chance of detecting it on the bulletin board.
For large-scale tampering, the odds are much higher.
ThreeBallot’s non-intuitive ballot marking scheme may impact usability: in a mock
election, a large number of voters experienced difficulty using ThreeBallot and more
than 30% of initial cast votes proved invalid [134]. There are also security issues: a
coercer may force Alice to mark her ballots in certain unique patterns which he can later
identify on the bulletin board. These issues and potential solutions are documented in
[133] [135] [136] [137] [55].
Rivest and Smith also presented two systems that are variations on ThreeBallot,
VAV (Vote/AntiVote/Vote) and Twin [134]. The VAV ballot suite, depicted in Fig. 12(b),
consists of two Vote ballots, and one AntiVote ballot. The marking process differs from
ThreeBallot in that only one candidate is marked on each ballot. The AntiVote ballot
essentially cancels out one Vote ballot, and both have to be marked identically. The left-
over Vote determines Alice’s actual choice (Fig. 12(b) depicts a vote for Nihilist). Alice
scans one of the three ballots at random to use as a receipt. Tallying and verification
processes for VAV are very similar to ThreeBallot.
Twin is based on traditional voting systems in that the voter casts only one ballot,
but with the innovation that Alice does not take home her own receipt but that of another
voter. In this scenario, a big bin in the polling station is periodically filled with valid
receipts. After casting her vote, Alice makes her way to the bin, draws out a receipt at
random, and takes a copy home, which she later verifies on the bulletin board. These
receipts are therefore referred to as floating receipts. This system is very easy to use,
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NIHILIST 
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BALLOT 
___ 
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ALCHEMIST 
 
 
ANARCHIST 
 
 
BUDDHIST 
 
 
NIHILIST 
VIN 
394852049 
BALLOT 
___ 
___
___
___ 
X 
OCN 
9384627 
receipt vote ballot 
Fig. 13. The Randell & Ryan Scratch Card Voting ballot
and though individual vote verifiability is sacrificed, voters can still verify the election
tally and coercion resistance is ensured.
Randell & Ryan’s Scratch Card Voting System In 2006, Randell and Ryan proposed
a voting system [138] that augments the Preˆt a` Voter ballot with scratch surfaces and
dispenses with cryptography and mixnets.
The ballot, depicted in Fig. 13, is detachable in two halves along the middle. Candi-
date names are listed in randomized order on the left side with corresponding markable
spaces on the right. The Vote Identification Number (VIN), functioning as a unique se-
rial number for the ballot, is duplicated on both halves, except on the right it is printed
atop a scratch surface. The scratch surface conceals an encoding of the candidate order-
ing on the ballot, referred to as the Order of Candidate Names (OCN).
On election day, Alice marks her candidate choice on the ballot, detaches the right
side and casts it in the ballot box. The left side serves as her receipt. Election staff will
accept her vote only if the scratch surface is still intact. After polls close, VINs of all
cast votes are published on a bulletin board and Alice can ensure the system received
her ballot. To process votes, election officials first remove the scratch surface of each
cast vote. This reveals the OCNs, enabling them to reconstruct the original candidate
ordering on the ballots, and thereby deduce the voters’ choices and compute the tally.
More importantly, removing the scratch surface also destroys the VIN on top, protecting
voter privacy. Once the VIN is removed, Alice’s vote can no longer be differentiated
from other cast votes.
The OCNs are simple codes, each of which maps to a different candidate ordering.
Prior to casting her vote, Alice can audit her ballot by simply removing the scratch
surface, decoding the OCN, and verifying if it matches the candidate ordering on the
ballot. However, removing the scratch surface invalidates the ballot, and she will need
a new one to cast her vote. Alice can audit as many ballots as she likes until she is
convinced the ballots are correctly formed, and then cast her vote.
This system provides a subset of E2E properties. Only received VINs are published
on the bulletin board, providing Alice assurance that her vote has been received, but
not that it has been recorded and tallied exactly as she cast it. Cast ballots are not
published as it would make it trivially easy for any party to deduce voters’ choices
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RECEIPT 
9U7K4A 
BALLOT 
X 
RECEIPT 
NIHILIST 
 
 
ANARCHIST 
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ALCHEMIST 
9U7K4A 
AUDIT SHEET: 
GOLDENROD 
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R#: 279 
AUDIT SHEET: 
PINK 
X 
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BALLOT 
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X 
Fig. 14. The Aperio ballot assembly with a vote for Anarchist
from their receipts. Furthermore, removing the scratch surface irretrievably destroys
the link between cast votes and counted votes, and Alice has no means of verifying that
election officials correctly included her vote in the tally and did not replace it with a fake
one. To increase transparency, Randell and Ryan suggest instituting random audits, and
incorporating paper trails into the system.
Aperio Aperio [139], developed by Essex, Clark, and Adams in 2010, is intended for
low-tech minimal environments, such as elections in developing countries. Aperio de-
rives inspiration from PunchScan in its use of ballots with stacked sheets which enable
audit trails to defend against ballot box stuffing and ballot tampering.
The Aperio ballot suite, depicted in Fig. 14, consists of a ballot with randomized
candidate names, a receipt layer and multiple distinctly coloured audit layers (we as-
sume two audit layers in this example, coloured pink and goldenrod). The sheets are
backed with carbon paper so that marks made on the ballot are copied onto the lower
layers. Receipt and audit sheets each bear a unique reference number, the receipt serial
number and the audit reference number, respectively.
In the election setup phase, election trustees assemble the ballot suites by super-
imposing the individual sheets and binding them together. They also generate two lists
for each individual audit layer: a receipt commitment list linking each receipt serial
number to an audit reference number, and a ballot commitment list linking the audit
reference number to ballot candidate ordering. Fig. 15 includes sample entries for these
lists for the ballot suite in Fig. 14. These commitment lists are secured in separate
tamper-evident envelopes and placed in safe custody prior to polls.
To cast her vote, Alice marks her candidate choice on the ballot suite and hands it
to a member of the polling staff who ensures that the counterfoil is still intact. If not,
the vote is rejected. If intact, the staff member then separates the four sheets. The ballot
is cast in the ballot box, the receipt is issued to Alice to take home, and the audit sheets
are cast in corresponding pink and goldenrod-coloured audit boxes. After polls close,
results are tallied by simply counting the votes in the ballot box.
To audit the election, the trustees retrieve the receipt and ballot commitment lists.
They check the envelope to ensure there has been no tampering. A coin is publicly
tossed, and, depending on the result, one of the two coloured audit boxes is used to
generate a receipt audit trail and the other to generate a ballot audit trail. For example,
if the pink box is chosen to audit receipts, the envelopes containing the pink receipt
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AUDIT SHEET: 
PINK 
X 
9U7K4A R#: 568 
Receipt Commitment List 
Ref. # Receipt # 
… … 
568 9U7K4A 
… … 
Ballot Commitment List 
Ref. # Receipt # 
… … 
279 NIHILIST, 
ANARCHIST, 
MARXIST, 
ALCHEMIST 
… … 
RECEIPT 
9U7K4A 
X 
compare audit sheet 
with voter’s original 
receipt 
AUDIT SHEET: 
GOLDENROD 
X 
R#: 279 
NIHILIST 
 
 
ANARCHIST 
 
 
MARXIST 
 
 
ALCHEMIST 
BALLOT 
X 
NIHILIST 
 
 
ANARCHIST 
 
 
MARXIST 
 
 
ALCHEMIST 
compare tally of 
reconstructed 
votes with original 
tally 
Fig. 15. Auditing receipts and ballots in Aperio
commitment list and the goldenrod ballot commitment list are opened. The envelopes
containing the pink ballot commitment list and the goldenrod receipt commitment list
are destroyed.
The commitment lists and audit sheets enable individual reconstruction of the vote
and the receipt, as depicted in Fig. 15. The pink audit sheet already bears the mark for
Alice’s candidate choice. Election staff search for the sheet’s audit reference number
(568 in our example) in the receipt commitment list and note the corresponding receipt
serial number (9U7K4A) by hand on the sheet. This step effectively reconstructs Alice’s
receipt. Reconstructed receipts are posted on the bulletin board where voters can verify
them against the receipts issued to them earlier.
Likewise, the reference number on the goldenrod audit sheet (279 in this case) iden-
tifies a specific candidate ordering in the ballot commitment list. Trustees write this
ordering on the sheet, thereby reconstructing the vote. These votes are then counted
independently and results are compared with the official tally.
Aperio’s key novelty is that receipts and ballots are audited separately. The act of de-
stroying the unused commitment lists effectively decouples the ballots from the receipts,
thereby preserving voter privacy. Alice can verify her vote was correctly recorded by
comparing her receipt against the reconstructed receipts. Election trustees and observers
ensure the votes have been correctly counted if the tally of the reconstructed votes
matches the original results. However, as in the case of paper-based E2E systems, cer-
tain coercion attacks, such as randomized voting, still apply.
Aperio has inspired an electronic counterpart, Eperio [140], which employs crypto-
graphic primitives to similarly verify votes against commitment lists. Another system,
Hash-Only Verification (Hover) [141], uses this verification approach in conjunction
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with the Scantegrity optical-scan system to reduce reliance on election trustees and
make the voting system intelligible to non-technical voters.
5 The Way Forward for E2E Voting Systems
As described thus far, considerable work has been done on developing E2E voting
systems and reconciling theoretical notions with practical realities. However, to fully
transition these systems into the real world, a host of pressing technical issues, usabil-
ity concerns, and legal dilemmas still need to be resolved. In this section, we briefly
overview progress and outstanding challenges in these domains.
5.1 Technical Issues
As often happens when prototyping theoretical systems, the implementation itself may
introduce security flaws. Karlof et al. [142] analyzed two systems, Votegrity and Mark-
Pledge, and described several scenarios where voter privacy and election integrity may
be compromised by exploiting flaws in how the systems were built. For instance, mali-
cious software on voting machines could encrypt votes in a manner that surreptitiously
leaks information regarding the voter’s candidate choice. Malicious voting machines
may sabotage an election by issuing large numbers of forged or invalid receipts. Large
scale attacks would be detected but may negatively impacting public confidence in the
system. Human factors also need to be considered. For instance, voters who do not in-
tend to verify their votes may discard their receipts on polling premises where a poll
worker could collect them and later manipulate the corresponding votes without fear of
detection.
Researchers have presented various practical guidelines to implementing voting sys-
tems: Karlof et al. advocate a systems approach [142] which essentially states that
security analyses of such systems should not examine system components in isolation
but consider the entire system and how the individual parts interact with each other.
Bruck et al. strongly caution against “all-at-once” approaches [143] to building vot-
ing equipment where diverse functionality is bundled together into the same hardware
components. They propose a highly modular architecture, dubbed Frog voting, which
clearly partitions processes such as voter registration, vote recording, casting, tallying,
and auditing, thereby reducing complexity, simplifying certification, and encouraging
incremental innovation. Rivest and Wack have proposed the principle of software inde-
pendence [144] urging that the integrity of election results should not be dependent on
the software used by the system. Popoveniuc et al. [145] also detail a series of security
checks which ensure E2E verifiability properties of a voting system.
A second major direction of research has been to improve individual components
of voting systems. There is a significant body of work on securing electronic voting
machines. For instance, researchers have proposed the use of trusted hardware, i.e.
specialized tamper-proof chips which protect cryptographic credentials and guarantee
that voting machines run trusted software [146] [147] [148]. Researchers have also
identified critical security properties that voting machines must ensure, and proposed
corresponding solutions [149] [150]. Another key component in E2E voting systems is
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the public bulletin board and various solutions have been put forward to implement it
[151] [152] and make it robust against attacks [103] [153].
Online voting has also received considerable attention. Proposed methods to de-
feat hackers and malware include the use of visual cryptography techniques [154],
CAPTCHAs [155], voice recognition [156], and deploying assistive handheld devices
[157]. However, voter privacy and coercion concerns still persist.
Unfortunately, most of these solutions have been proposed piecemeal and it is un-
clear if and how they will fit together. There have been very few attempts, like VoteBox
(described earlier in Sec. 3.2), to harmonize these various innovations in the context of
a complete E2E voting system. Substantial work is still needed in this domain before
E2E voting systems are deployed for mainstream use.
5.2 Usability
The importance of usability for a voting system cannot be emphasized enough and
usability oftentimes conflicts with security properties. Ensuring system usability is also
complicated by the fact that elections occur only rarely and voters must be able to vote
with near 100% success while having little or no experience or training on that voting
system. This problem also extends to poll workers and election officials who may have
limited technical expertise and experience regarding certain systems. For these reasons,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has advocated a broad all-
encompassing perspective to study usability within the context of the complete voting
system, including the physical environment, the voting product, the ballot, the voter,
and all personnel involved in the process [158].
At this particular stage in the development of E2E voting systems, the central usabil-
ity concerns are whether voters can successfully cast their votes using these systems,
and more importantly, whether or not they are able to undertake the verification process.
Regarding vote casting, evidence suggests that certain design features of these systems
are problematic. In one study, the ballot design of Preˆt a` Voter, requiring voters to shred
half of their ballot to ensure vote privacy caused confusion [159]. A preliminary study
involving Helios, Preˆt a` Voter, and Scantegrity II found that a significant number of
voters failed to cast a vote with each system [35]. Troublingly, many of those voters
thought they had in fact successfully cast a vote. It also took almost twice as long to
cast a ballot as with a traditional paper-based system.
Individual vote verification is a new and novel concept for voters and adds a layer
of complexity. Critically, voters are active participants in auditing the election and cer-
tifying its results, and if, for whatever reason they are unable to verify their votes, the
system’s security guarantees become mute and the system is not auditable. Recent test-
ing and ‘live’ applications of E2E systems have resulted not just in consistently low
rates of voter verification but even lower rates for those who actually report discrepan-
cies [160] [38]. This is likely due to two reasons.
First, voters do not see the need to verify their vote. One possible explanation for
this is that trust-transference from election authorities to voter does not happen. As
Olembo et al. [161] discovered, voters may initially verify their vote out of curiosity,
but after continued use of the system, they establish trust in the system and verification
is deemed unnecessary. In line with this conclusion, recent usability testing involving
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Helios and a Galois-designed prototype based on STAR-Vote, found that participants
had a tacit level of trust in any voting system provided it was officially branded e.g.
Jurisdiction X Official Election Website [36]. The participants considered verification
unnecessary if a voting system met this basic criterion.
The second concern is complexity. The verification process of Helios has repeatedly
been found to be difficult [34] [36]. The reasons may be technical or even that the voters
may not understand what to do since the verification language is not related to prior vot-
ing experience on their part. Research suggests that terms like “audit”, “verifiability”,
or “ballot fingerprint” lack clarity for voters, cause confusion, and do not engender trust
in the voting system [162]. This is critical as voters need to understand the necessity of
verification to be motivated to invest the extra effort in verifying their vote. The intu-
ition behind verification also needs to be effectively communicated. As Schneider et al.
discovered in their study concerning Preˆt a` Voter, simply confirming that an encrypted
vote on a bulletin board corresponded to a receipt did not provide sufficient security
guarantees for voters themselves [159].
Several technical solutions have been proposed in the literature, including simplify-
ing security elements or enhancing voting systems to facilitate individual vote verifica-
tion [163] [49], bundling multiple receipts to enable mass verification [70], or involving
third parties in the process, such as activist groups or helper organizations, [62] [64],
but these require further study from a usability perspective.
Overall, research in the usability of E2E voting systems is still in an early stage
and significant work is needed to demonstrate that these systems are accessible to non-
expert users while simultaneously maintaining the desired security properties.
5.3 Legal Framework
It is a common perception that numerous attempts to introduce new voting technology,
for example in Britain, Finland, Ireland, and Quebec, have failed in large part due to
the absence of a comprehensive supporting legal framework [164]. Indeed, many of the
issues regarding new voting technologies are not due to the technology itself, but rather
the lack of ancillary processes that establish trust in the voting system. A new paradigm,
like E2E voting, requires legislators to craft an appropriate legal framework that embeds
election norms and details administrative procedures to address risks, problems, and
threats. This includes aspects such as testing requirements, implementation instructions,
and processes for problem resolution.
A useful guiding principle in constructing a legal framework is that of functional
equivalence. Any new legal framework must essentially function in an equivalent way
to the legal framework for existing voting systems, i.e. the new framework must be at
least as good, if not better, than the old one. Towards this end, legislators need to iden-
tify the distinct purposes served by existing voting systems and ensure that new rules
also address the same needs. Applying this criterion to E2E voting systems requires
consideration that current electoral values and community expectations are preserved,
while making specific legislative changes to ensure that voting experiences using E2E
voting systems are as good as or better than existing procedures.
Another overarching concept is that of nondiscrimination [165]. A new legal frame-
work should not have the unintended consequence of discriminating against any voter.
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For instance, in the United States, any electronic technology, including voting equip-
ment, needs to be Section 508 compliant [166], i.e. it must attempt to fully accommo-
date disability groups. If E2E voting systems cannot successfully cater to certain voter
groups, legislation must set out clear alternatives to avoid discriminatory legal chal-
lenges. A good example is the case of absentee voting, where eligibility requirements
are defined, permitting certain groups to cast their votes remotely. Furthermore, legis-
lation should not unduly limit technological choices to certain vendors or technology
in cases where a better technology or solution exists. Excessive detail in legislation can
inhibit innovation and create legal technology locks [164].
An additional function of a legal framework is to minimize and mediate error
and risk. No electoral mechanism, be it electronic or paper, is ever absolutely secure
from every possible error or risk, and the greater question is whether the regulatory
framework provides voters and political stakeholders confidence that risk is minimized
and contingencies are in place to cover the range of possible circumstances.
Regarding specific properties to be included in legislation, Schwartz and Grice de-
tail the following normative values addressing electronic voting systems [167]:
– Accessibility and facilitate reasonable accommodation
– Voter anonymity
– Fairness
– Accurate and prompt results
– Comprehensible and transparent processes
– System security and risk assessment
– Detection of problems and remedial contingencies
– Legislative certainty and finality
– Effective and independent oversight
– Cost justification and efficiency
Many of these values could be embedded into a legal framework in the form of
technological choices within the specifications of an E2E voting system. For instance,
to deter coercion, voters may be permitted to change or update their vote once it has
been cast, as is the case of elections in Estonia [168]. Similarly, if multiple modes of
voting are available, legislation may specify that an electronic vote can be revoked if
the voter casts a paper ballot. Other technological specifications that may be considered
election norms include the capability to detect undervotes and overvotes on marked
ballots prior to casting and the ability to cast a blank ballot as a protest vote without it
being considered technically invalid.
It should be recognized that constructing a legal framework involves trade-offs be-
tween competing norms. An illustrative example is the case of Dutch voters and the
Rijnland Internet Election System (RIES) [169], an online voting system used for the
Rijnland District Water Board Elections in 2004. In the interest of transparency, most
of the RIES technology was made open-source. RIES provides a degree of verifiability
but weak privacy. Upon voting, the system generated a technical code, enabling voters
to verify their vote was included in the tally. However, if a voter disclosed her code, any
third party could determine her actual vote. In terms of norms, therefore, transparency
trumped voter privacy. Whereas this particular example may not directly apply to most
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E2E voting systems, where cryptography obfuscates the contents of the voter receipt,
it is indicative of the conflicts legislators will have to wrestle with in preparing a legal
framework for these new systems.
5.4 Uptake of E2E Voting Systems
Broadly speaking, uptake of a new voting system depends on how successfully it in-
corporates existing election norms, and equally importantly, how effectively this per-
ception is communicated to voters. Research on Internet voting lists four factors which
may serve as a good starting point to discuss the uptake of E2E voting systems [170].
These are security, privacy, accountability, and economic feasibility.
Regarding security and privacy, in Sec. 2 we have already motivated the funda-
mental requirement for voting systems to ensure vote privacy and election integrity.
However, security also needs to be considered in terms of reliability, i.e. how a system
isolates and reacts to failure. While a comprehensive legal framework will considerably
ameliorate failure reaction, a voting system should be designed so that there is no sin-
gle point of failure. As a risk assessment of large-scale events notes [171]: ‘If failure in
one part of an information system can cause failure in other interconnected parts, then
the system is susceptible to cascade failure’. Furthermore, in the words of Pieters and
Becker [172]: “It is not only important that a system is reliable, it is also important that
people believe that the system is reliable.”
Fostering a common understanding of the risks associated with a voting system
may actually advance acceptance. Risk exists even in paper-based elections but these
are generally known, accepted, and tolerated risks. Transparency and accountability are
key to minimizing risk, and risk perception, by detailing and perhaps even publicly
demonstrating potential risks and corresponding remedies. The legal framework should
require the electoral authority to establish a set of procedures and tests to be completed
before the voting system goes live. Additionally, procedures should be legislated that
provide solutions for potential risks and these should be updated before each election
to ensure protection against new threats or vulnerabilities.
Moreover, comprehensive and high quality voter instruction is critical to uptake of a
new system and typically falls under the auspices of the legal framework ensuring equal
access. Voter education is particularly important for a new paradigm like E2E voting.
These systems are radically different from existing systems that voters are accustomed
to, the intuition behind certain procedural steps may not be immediately clear, and they
have been known to confuse voters [159] [35] [36]. Furthermore, these systems task
voters with the extra responsibility of vote verification, the necessity of which needs
to be adequately explained and motivated. Dissemination of this instruction can take
many forms, including programs to educate the general public about E2E voting sys-
tems via various media, supplying user-friendly instructions, public demonstrations of
the technology, and maintaining phone help-lines to walk voters through the voting and
verification processes.
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6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have undertaken a comprehensive introduction to the burgeoning field
of end-to-end verifiable voting. We have traced the development of privacy and verifi-
ability properties in the literature and described the workings of current state-of-the-art
E2E voting systems. In our classification, we have attempted to track the intellectual
evolution of these systems and highlight the key cryptographic and procedural tech-
niques employed by their designers to harmonize security and usability concerns. We
have also discussed current challenges to the deployment of these systems, consisting
of outstanding technical, legal, and usability issues.
Advances in E2E verifiable voting have the potential to restore trust in elections
and improve democratic processes in society and, for that reason, we believe that the
importance of these developments must not be underestimated. Our intention, in writing
this chapter, has been to make the important innovations in this field accessible to a
wider audience. We hope our work serves as a useful resource in this regard and assists
in the future development of E2E voting.
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